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On Blass translation for Les´niewski’s
propositional ontology and modal logics
Takao Inoue´
Abstract. In this paper, we shall give another proof of the faithfulness of Blass transla-
tion (for short, B-translation) of the propositional fragment L1 of Les´niewski’s ontology in
the modal logic K by means of Hintikka formula. And we extend the result to von Wright-
type deontic logics, i.e., ten Smiley-Hanson systems of monadic deontic logic. As a result
of observing the proofs we shall give general theorems on the faithfulness of B-translation
with respect to normal modal logics complete to serial or transitive or irreflexive or Eu-
clidean or reflexive or symmetric Kripke frames. As an application of the theorems, for
example, B-translation is faithful for the provability logic PrL (= GL), that is, K +
✷(✷φ ⊃ φ) ⊃ ✷φ. The faithfulness also holds for normal modal logics, e.g., KD, KT,
K4, KD4, KB, KB4, KTB, S4 and S5. We shall conclude this paper with the section
of comments which contains my ideas for the translations, some open problems and my
conjectures.
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rial frame, transitive frame, irreflexive frame, Euclidean frame, (almost) reflexive frame,
(almost) symmetric frame, dense frame, convergent frame, bi-intuitionistic logic, display
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1. Introduction
In Inoue´ [19], a partial interpretation of Les´niewski’s epsion ǫ in the modal
logic K and its certain extensions was proposed: that is, Ishimoto’s propo-
sitional fragment L1 (Ishimoto [24]) of Les´niewski’s ontology L (refer to Ur-
baniak [43]) is partially embedded in K and in the extensions, respectively,
by the following translation I(·) from L1 to them:
(1.i) I(φ ∨ ψ) = I(φ) ∨ I(ψ),
(1.ii) I(¬φ) = ¬I(φ),
(1.iii) I(ǫab) = pa ∧ ✷(pa ≡ pb),
where pa and pb are propositional variables corresponding to the name vari-
ables a and b, respectively. Here, “L1 is partially embedded in K by I(·)”
1
2means that for any formula φ of a certain decidable nonempty set of formu-
las of L1 (i.e. decent formulas (see §3 of Inoue´ [21])), φ is a theorem of L1
if and only if I(φ) is a theorem of K. Note that I(·) is sound.
The paper [21] also proposed similar interpretations of Les´niewski’s ep-
silon in certain von Wright-type deontic logics, that is, ten Smiley-Hanson
systems of monadic deontic logic and in provability logics (i.e., the full sys-
tem PrL (= GL) of provability logic and its subsystem BML (= K4),
respectively. (See A˚qvist [1], and Smoryn´ski [38] or Boolos [3] for those
logics.)
The interpretation I(·) is however not faithful. A counterexample for
the faithfulness is, for example, ǫac ∧ ǫbc. ⊃ .ǫab ∨ ǫcc (for the details, see
[21]). Blass [2] gave a modification of the interpretation and showed that
his interpretation T (·) is faithful, using Kripke models. In this paper, we
shall call the faithful interpretation (denoted by B(·)) Blass translation (for
short, B-translation) or Blass interpretation (for short, B-interpretation).
The translation B(·) from L1 to K is defined as follows:
(2.i) B(φ ∨ ψ) = B(φ) ∨B(ψ),
(2.ii) B(¬φ) = ¬B(φ),
(2.iii) B(ǫab) = pa ∧ ✷(pa ⊃ pb) ∧ .pb ⊃ ✷(pb ⊃ pa),
where pa and pb are propositional variables corresponding to the name vari-
ables a and b, respectively.
Later, I found another faithful and sound translation (embedding) of
from L1 to K taking
(1.W) I(ǫab) = ⋄pa ⊃ pa. ∧ ✷(pa ≡ pb)
instead of (1.iii) (see Inoue´ [22]).
Now the purpose of this paper is to give another proof of the faithfulness
of Blass translation (B-translation) of Les´niewski’s propositional ontology
L1 in the modal logic K by means of Hintikka formula. This will be done in
§4. In §3, we shall give chain equivalence relation and so on, as important
technical tools for this paper. After the main result in §4, we shall extend
the faithfulness result to von Wright-type deontic logics, i.e., ten Smiley-
Hanson systems of monadic deontic logics in §5. Observing the proof of the
faithfulness for K, we shall, in §6, give a general theorem on the faithfulness
of B-translation with respect to normal modal logics with transitive or ir-
reflexive frames. As an application of the generalization, we shall obtain the
faithfulness for provability logics (i.e., the full system PrL (= GL) of prov-
ability logic and its subsystem BML (= K4)). PrL is characterized by K
+ ✷(✷φ ⊃ φ) ⊃ ✷φ. PrL is also characterized by K4 + ✷(✷φ ⊃ φ) ⊃ ✷φ.
3From careful consideration of the proof of the faithfulness for deontic log-
ics, we shall obtain further general theorems for the faithfulness for the
propositional normal modal logics which are complete to serial or transitive
or irreflexive or Euclidean or almost reflexive or almost symmetric Kripke
frames. We shall also consider reflexive and symmetric relations, among oth-
ers, i.e. dense and convergent relations As the result of the consideration,
we shall show that the faithfulness also holds for normal modal logics, e.g.,
KD, KT, K4, KD4, KB, KB4, KTB, S4 and S5. This will be presented
in §7. The section of comments (§8) contains some open problems and my
conjectures. In the following §2, we shall first collect the basic preliminaries
for this paper.
2. Propositional ontology L1 and its tableau method
Let us recall a formulation of L1, which was introduced in [24]. The Hilbert-
style system of it, denoted again by L1, consists of the following axiom-
schemata with a formulation of classical propositional logic CP as its ax-
iomatic basis:
(Ax1) ǫab ⊃ ǫaa,
(Ax2) ǫab ∧ ǫbc. ⊃ ǫac,
(Ax3) ǫab ∧ ǫbc. ⊃ ǫba,
where we note that every atomic formula of L1 is of the form ǫab for some
name variables a and b and a possible intuitive interpretation of ǫab is ‘the
a is b’.
We note that (Ax1), (Ax2) and (Ax3) are theorems of Les´niewski’s on-
tology (see S lupecki [35]).
The modal logic K is the smallest logic which contains all instances of
classical tautology and all formulas of the forms✷(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ .✷φ ⊃ ✷ψ being
closed under modus ponens and the rule of necessitation (for K and basics
for modal logic, see Bull and Segerberg [4], Chagrov and Zakharyaschev [6],
Fitting [7], Hughes and Cresswell [14] and so on).
Let us take ∨ (disjunction) and ¬ (negation) as primitive for the pure
propositional logic part of L1. We shall employ a useful tool, i.e. positive
(negative) parts (for short, p.p.’s (n.p.’s)) of a formula due to Schu¨tte [32]
and [34]. The positive and negative parts of a formula φ of L1 are inductively
defined as follows: (i) φ is a p.p. of φ; (ii) If η ∨ ξ is a p.p. of φ, then η and
ξ are p.p.’s of φ; (iii) If ¬ψ is a p.p. of φ, then ψ is a n.p. of φ; (iv) If ¬ψ is
a n.p. of φ, then ψ is a p.p. of φ.
4By a notation F [φ+] (G[φ−]), which also is due to [32], we mean that
a formula φ occurs in a formula F [φ+] (G[φ−]), as a p.p. (n.p.) of F [φ+]
(G[φ−]). Such expressions as F [φ+, ψ−] and the like are understood analo-
gously under the conditions such that for example, F [φ+, ψ−], the specified
formulas φ (as a p.p.) and ψ (as a n.p.) in F [φ+, ψ−] do not overlap with
each other.
Definition 2.1. (Kobayashi-Ishimoto [27]) A formula φ of L1 is said to be
a Hintikka formula of L1 if it satisfies all the following conditions: (1) φ is
not of the form F [ψ+, ψ−]; (2) If φ contains η ∨ ξ as a n.p. of φ, then it
contains η or ξ as a n.p. of it; (3) If φ contains ǫab as a n.p. of φ, then it
contains ǫaa as a n.p. of it; (4) If φ contains ǫab and ǫbc as n.p.’s of φ, then
it contains ǫac as a n.p. of it; (5) If φ contains ǫab and ǫbc as n.p.’s of φ,
then it contains ǫba as a n.p. of it.
We shall review the tableau method TL1 for L1. The tableau method
TL1 for L1 is defined on the basis of the following four reduction rules:
∨−
G[φ ∨ ψ−]
G[φ ∨ ψ−] ∨ ¬φ | G[φ ∨ ψ−] ∨ ¬ψ
ǫ1
G[ǫab−]
G[ǫab−] ∨ ¬ǫaa
ǫ2
G[ǫab−, ǫbc−]
G[ǫab−, ǫbc−] ∨ ¬ǫac
ǫ3
G[ǫab−, ǫbc−]
G[ǫab−, ǫbc−] ∨ ¬ǫba
where for TL1, we take the same logical symbols as primitive as for L1.
(This tableau method TL1 is due to [27].)
By reducing a formula by these reduction rules, we obtain a tableau of
the formula. A branch of a tableau is closed if it ends with a formula of the
form F [φ+, φ−], which is called an axiom of TL1. A branch of a tableau
is open if it is not closed. A tableau is said to be closed if every branch of
it is closed, otherwise we call it open. A tableau is said to be finite, if it
has a finite number of branches and evey branch of it is obtained by a finite
numbers of applications of reduction rules. A formula of TL1 is provable in
TL1 if there exists a closed tableau of it.
5Theorem 2.2. ([27] (The Fundamental Theorem for TL1) Given a formula
(of L1 (TL1)), by reducing it with reduction rules we obtain a finite tableau,
each branch of which ends either with an axiom of TL1 or with a Hintikka
formula, where every branch of it is extended by a reduction rule only if the
formula to be reduced, say φ, is not an axiom of TL1 and the reduction gives
rise to a formula not occurring in φ as a negative part of φ.
A tableau is said to be normal, if it is constructed in compliance with
the condition of Theorem 2.2.
If a normal tableau has a Hintikka formula φ at the end of some branch
of it (in other words, if the formula to be reduced is not provable in TL1),
then it is obvious from its normality that φ cannot be reduced further. Note
that a normal tableau of a formula is not always the shortest one of the
possible tableaux of it.
Definition 2.3. Let φ be a formula of L1. For any formula φ of L1, we call
ψ to be a Hintikka formula of φ, if one of open branches of a normal tableau
of φ ends with ψ.
Theorem 2.4. ([20] and [27]) For any formula φ of L1, we have
⊢TL1 φ⇔ ⊢L1 φ.
A p.p. is said to be minimal if it is not of the form ¬φ or φ ∨ ψ. A n.p.
is said to be mininal if it is not of the form ¬φ. (See [34, p.12]).
We need the following theorem for the proof of our main theorem.
Theorem 2.5. ([34, p.12]) If, under a sentential valuation v, every minimal
p.p. of a formula φ takes the value 0 (falsity) and every minimal n.p. of φ
takes the value 1 (truth), then every p.p. of φ takes the value 0 and every
n.p. of φ takes the value 1. (In particular, v(φ) = 0 holds, since φ is a p.p.
of φ.)
3. Chain equivalence relation, one more preliminary
As one more preliminary, we introduce the notion of chain equivalence classes
and tails of a Hintikka formula, which are important for our proofs.
Definition 3.1. For any formula φ of L1, the name vaiable set NVφ of φ is
defined as follows:
NVφ = {a : a is a name variable of φ}.
6We note that for any formula φ of L1, for any Hintikka formula ψ of φ,
NVφ = NVψ holds.
Definition 3.2. For any Hintikka formula φ of L1, the chain name variable
set CNφ of φ is defined as follows:
CNφ = {a ∈ NVφ : ∃b ∈ NVφ(φ = G[ǫab−, ǫba−])}.
It is possible that CNφ is empty for some Hintikka formula φ, e.g. φ =
ǫaa.
Definition 3.3. For any Hintikka formula φ of L1, we define a relation on
the chain name vaiable set CNφ of φ is defined as follows:
∼φ= {(a, b) ∈ CNφ × CNφ : φ = G[ǫab−, ǫba−]}.
Proposition 3.4. For any Hintikka formula φ of L1, the relation ∼φ on
CNφ is an equivalence relation.
Proof. Let φ be a Hintikka formula of L1. For any a ∈ CNφ, G[ǫaa−] = φ
holds by Definition 2.1.(3) and Definition 3.3. So we have the reflexivity
a ∼φ a. For any a, b ∈ CNφ, the symmetry (a ∼φ b⇒ b ∼φ a) trivially holds
by Definition 3.3 and the definition of negative parts. For any a, b, c ∈ CNφ,
we have
a ∼φ b, b ∼φ c⇒ φ = G1[ǫab−, ǫba−, ǫbc−, ǫcb−].
Apply Definition 2.1.(4) and Definition 3.3 to pairs (ǫab, ǫbc) and (ǫcb, ǫba).
Then,
φ = G2[ǫac−, ǫca−].
This means a ∼φ c. So we obtain the transitivity. Hence the relation is an
equivalence relation.
Definition 3.5. Let φ be a Hintikka formula of L1. For any a ∈ CNφ, the
equivalence class of a with respect to ∼φ,
[a]∼φ = {b ∈ CNφ : a ∼φ b}
is the set of all elements of CNφ equivalent to a, which we call the chain
equivalence class of a (with respect to ∼φ).
Definition 3.6. For any Hintikka formula φ of L1, we define ”CNφ modulo
∼φ” to be the set
ChainQ(φ) = CNφ/ ∼φ= {[a]∼φ : a ∈ CNφ}
of all chain equivalence classes of CNφ. We call ChainQ(φ) the chain quo-
tient set of φ.We call an element of ChainQ(φ) a chain of φ.
7Definition 3.7. ([27]) For any Hintikka formula φ of L1, a Kobayashi-
Ishimoto-chain of φ is a nonempty (finite) set C of name variables, say
C = {a1, a2, . . . , an} (n ≥ 1) such that: (1) Every pair ai and aj (1 ≤ i ≤ n,
1 ≤ j ≤ n) belonging to C are connected by a relation defined as ǫaiaj and
ǫajai both of which are n.p.’s of φ;(2) The set is maximal with respect to
the property in (1).
Definition 3.8. For any Hintikka formula φ of L1, we define Kobayashi-
Ishimoto-chain set ChainKI(φ) of φ as follows:
ChainKI(φ) = {C : C is a Kobayashi-Ishimoto-chain of φ}.
Proposition 3.9. For any Hintikka formula φ of L1, we have
ChainQ(φ) = ChainKI(φ).
Proof. Let φ be a Hintikka formula of L1. We first prove ChainQ(φ) ⊆
ChainKI(φ). Let C be an element of ChainQ(φ). Take a name variable a
such that C = [a]∼φ holds. For any x, y ∈ C, φ = G[ǫxy−, ǫyx−] holds, since
φ = G1[ǫxa−, ǫax−, ǫya−, ǫay−].
Apply Definition 2.1.(4) and Definition 3.3 to pairs (ǫxa, ǫay) and (ǫya, ǫax).
Then,
φ = G[ǫxy−, ǫyx−].
This satisfies Definition 3.7.(1). By Definition 3.6, C ∈ ChainQ(φ) is an
element of a partition of CNφ. So C satisfies Definition 3.7.(2). Hence
C ∈ ChainKI(φ).
We shall prove ChainKI(φ) ⊆ ChainQ(φ). Let C be an element of
ChainKI(φ). By Definition 3.6, we have
C ⊆ CNφ.
Take an element a of C, arbitrarily. Then, by Defintion 3.7.(1), φ =
G[ǫax−, ǫxa−] holds for any x ∈ C. We obtain C ⊆ [a]∼φ . Let y ∈ [a]∼φ . The
maximality of C follows y ∈ C. So, C = [a]∼φ . Thus C ∈ ChainQ(φ).
Thus, a Kobayashi-Ishimoto-chain is nothing but our chain. Our Defini-
tion 3.6 clarifies the notion of Kobayashi-Ishimoto-chains.
Definition 3.10. ([27]) For any Hintikka formula φ of L1 and any chain C
of φ, a tail of C is a name variable b such that ǫab is a n.p. of φ with a ∈ C
and b /∈ C. By TNφ, we denote the set of all tails of a Hintikka formula φ.
8We may have a chain of a given Hintikka formula φ without tails, e.g.
φ = ¬ǫaa.
Proposition 3.11. For any Hintikka formula φ of L1 and any chain C of
φ, no tail of C belongs to any other chains of φ.
Proof. Let φ be a Hintikka formula of L1. Let C1 and C2 be distinct chains
of φ and b a tail of C1. We may suppose that they are nonempty. Then
there is a name variable a of C1 such that ǫab is a n.p. of φ. Suppose that
b is a member of C2. Since b is an element of C2, by Definition 3.2, there is
some name variable, say c such that ǫbc and ǫcb are n.p.’s of φ. Since ǫab is
a n.p. of φ, by Definition 2.1.(5), φ contains ǫba as its n.p.. In other words,
b is a member of C1, which contradicts the definition of tails.
Definition 3.12. Let φ be a Hintikka formula of L1. By Restφ, we denote
NVφ − (CNφ ∪ TNφ).
We can analyse the set of name variable occurring in the set of all minimal
(atomic) p.p.’s and n.p.’s of a Hintikka formula of L1. And it plays an
important role for the proof of our main theorem.
Theorem 3.13. (Characterization Theorem for name variables of a Hintikka
formula) For any Hintikka formula φ of L1 and any name variable a ∈
Restφ, a occurs in some minimal p.p. of φ. Further,
NVφ = CNφ ∐ TNφ ∐ Restφ (∗)
holds, where ∐ means a disjoint union.
Proof. Let φ be a Hintikka formula of L1. From Definition 3.10 and Propo-
sition 3.11, we have CNφ ∪ TNφ = CNφ ∐ TNφ. From Definition 3.12, this
leads to (∗).
Lemma 3.14. (Tail Lemma) Let φ be a Hintikka formula of L1. For any tail
a of a Chain of φ and any b ∈ NVφ, ǫab does not occur as a n.p. of φ.
Proof. Let φ be a Hintikka formula of L1. Let a be a tail of a chain of φ
and b ∈ NVφ. Suppose φ = G[ǫab−]. Since φ is a Hintikka formula of L1,
we have φ = G1[ǫab−, ǫaa−]. This means a ∈ [a]∼φ . That is, a is an element
of the chain [a]∼φ . This contradicts Proposition 3.11.
94. Another proof of the faithfulness of B-translation using
Hintikka formula
In this section, we shall prove the faithfulness of B-translation by means of
Hintikka formula with respect to K, that is:
Theorem 4.1. (Blass [2]) For any formula φ of L1, we have
(♣) ⊢K B(φ)⇒ ⊢L1 φ.
That is, B-translation is faithful with respect to K.
Proof. Let φ be a formula of L1. For the proof, it is sufficient to show
that (not ⊢TL1 φ) ⇒ (not ⊢K B(φ)). Then by Theorem 2.4 we obtain the
desired meta-implication in (♣). If φ is a theorem of TL1, then we trivially
have the meta-implication. Suppose that φ is not a theorem of TL1. Then,
there exists an open normal tableau such that it has a branch ended with a
Hintikka formula, say ψ. We immediately see that φ is a p.p. of ψ (observe
the reduction rules for TL1). (We can eventually prove it by induction on
derivation.) That is, ψ is a Hintikka formula of φ. We may choose such
a Hintikka formula arbitrarily as a Hintikka formula of φ for our model
construction below.
Let v be a sentential valuation such that by v, every atomic p.p. (n.p.) of
ψ is assigned falsity 0 (truth 1) (the rest of the assignment is at a person’s
disposal), where we do not need to look into the structure of atomic formulas
such as ǫab. Since ψ is a Hintikka formula, the valuation v makes every
minimal p.p. (n.p.) false (true). Hence by Theorem 2.5, if we have v(ψ) = 0,
then v(φ) = 0 holds, since φ is a p.p. of ψ.
Since B(·) commutes disjunction and negation, B(φ) in the setting of K
is falsified by the (adapted) valuation v such that we have v(ψ) = 0 in that
of L1. In other words, in B(φ) we can regard formulas of the form B(ǫab)
as atomic formulas, when we assign truth-values to them in order to falsify
B(φ).
We shall below construct such a valuation, namely a model in which
B(φ) is false. (If we have a model falsifying B(φ), then by the completeness
theorem for K, B(φ) is not a theorem of K.) Given a Hintikka formula ψ,
we have a finite numbers of its chains and their associated tails, observing
its atomic negative and positive parts. Say ChainQ(ψ) = {C1, . . . , Cn}
(n ≥ 0). If n = 0 (that is, ψ contains no atomic negative parts), then we
take a Kripke model M0 =< G0, R0, V0 > such that
G0 = {∗, g} ∪Gω (∗ 6= g), R0 = {(∗, g) ∪ {(η, η) : η ∈ Gω}.
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V0(pa, x) = 0 for any name variable a and any x ∈ G0, where
Gω = {ηj : j ∈ ω}, Card(Gω) = ℵ0, {∗, g} ∩Gω = ∅.
(V0(p, x) stands for the truth-value of a propositional variable p in a world
x (by V0) in M0). Then we easily see that B(φ) is false in ∗ in M0, since
B(ǫab), that is,
pa ∧ ✷(pa ⊃ pb) ∧ .pb ⊃ ✷(pb ⊃ pa)
is trivially false in ∗ in M0 regardless of the modality. So suppose n ≥ 1.
Now we shall construct a Kripke model M =< G,R, V > (below we shall
write g |= φ for |=Mg φ (i.e., φ is true in a world g in M) as follows.
(M1) G = {∗, g1, . . . , gn} ∪Gω,
where Gω = {ηj : j ∈ ω}, Card(Gω) = ℵ0, {∗, g1, . . . , gn} ∩ Gω = ∅ and
∗, g1, . . . , gn are distinct.
(M2) R = {(∗, gi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {(η, η) : η ∈ Gω}.
(M3)
(i) For any name variable a ∈ NVψ,
V (pa, ∗) =
{
1 if a ∈ CNψ,
0 otherwise.
(ii) Take one name variable ci from each Ci (1 ≤ i ≤ n) as its representa-
tive, that is, say Ci = [ci]∼ψ . Assume that if the pci is assigned a truth-value
in a world, then every propositional variable p corresponding to the other
name variable belonged to Ci should be assigned the same truth-value in the
same world. Under this assumption, we take the following assignment:


V (pc1 , g1) V (pc1 , g2) . . . V (pc1 , gn)
V (pc2 , g1) V (pc2 , g2) . . . V (pc2 , gn)
...
...
. . .
...
V (pcn , g1) V (pcn , g2) . . . V (pcn , gn)

 = U
where U is n×n unit matrix in linear algebra. (Here we remark that for this
construction of Kripke model, we do not need the notion of connectedness
used in [21].) We remark that the order of C1, . . . , Cn does not matter.
(iii) If a name variable a is a tail of some chain, we take the following
assignment. First fix the assingment of (M3).(ii). Take all chains such that
a is a tail of them, say C˜1, . . . , C˜M (0 ≤ M ≤ n) (if there is a tail, then
M ≥ 1). Choose di ∈ C˜i for any 1 ≤ i ≤ M , arbitrarily. Take all indices
ξ1, . . . , ξM such that V (pdi , gξi) = 1 for any 1 ≤ i ≤M (note that di may be
eventually equal to cξi in the notation of (M3).(ii)). Such ξ1, . . . , ξM exist
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because of (M3).(ii), Proposition 3.4 and Definition 3.6. Then take, for any
1 ≤ i ≤ n,
V (pa, gi) =
{
1 if i ∈ {ξ1, . . . , ξM},
0 otherwise.
(iv) For any p of the rest of propositional variables and any 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
V (p, gi) = 0.
(v) For any propositional variable p and any η ∈ Gω, V (p, η) = 1.
Now, let us verify that the model just constructed above actually falsifies
B(ψ) in the world ∗, which makes B(ψ) invalid. So 6|=K B(φ) holds from
Theorem 2.5. Thus, 6⊢K B(φ) by the completeness theorem for K. Let
D1, . . . ,Ds be all distinct atomic p.p.’s of ψ and E1, . . . , Et all distinct atomic
n.p.’s of ψ (s + t ≥ 1, t ≥ 1) because of n ≥ 1. In order to apply Theorem
2.5 to our case, we have to show that
(†) ∗ 6|= B(Dk) for any 1 ≤ k ≤ s (s may possibly be 0.),
(††) ∗ |= B(Ek) for any 1 ≤ k ≤ t.
First we remark that we do not need to consider the worlds of Gω at all,
since ∗ does not relate any element of Gω. We put the Gω in order to keep
a generality of models.
For verifying (†) and (††), we need to classify all the name variables (in
minimal parts of ψ) occurring in ψ, thus in φ as follows.
(NV1) All distinct name variables occurring in chains, say x1, . . . , xp
(p ≥ 1). Note CNψ = {x1, . . . , xp}.
(NV2) All distinct name variables which are tails of some chain, say
y1, . . . , yq (q ≥ 0). So, TNφ = {y1, . . . , yq}.
(NV3) All distinct name variables which are not tails, occurring in some
atomic positive parts of B, but not in any of chains, say z1, . . . , zr (r ≥ 0),
that is, Restφ = {z1, . . . , zr}.
Note that x1, . . . , xp, y1, . . . , yq, z1, . . . , zr are mutually distinct variables
because of Theorem 3.13.
We shall first verify (†). There are the following cases (Case 1)–(Case 5)
for Dk (1 ≤ k ≤ s). Suppose s ≥ 1. If s = 0, we ignore the verification for
the cases..
(Case 1): The case of Dk = ǫxixj or ǫxjxi for any i and j with i < j, such
that xi and xj are not in the same chain. (Because of Definitions 2.1.(1) and
3.5, it is not possible that xi and xj belong to the same chain, if ǫxixj is a
p.p. of ψ. We do not need to consider the case of i = j because of Definition
2.1.(1).) In this case, by (M3).(ii), there are exactly two indices α and β
(α 6= β) (1 ≤ α ≤ n, 1 ≤ β ≤ n) such that
(a) xi ∈ [cα], gα |= pxi , gα 6|= pxj ,
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(b) xj ∈ [cβ ], gβ |= pxj , gβ 6|= pxi
hold. So we have gα 6|= pxi ⊃ pxj and gβ 6|= pxj ⊃ pxi . Since
∗ |= ✷(pxi ⊃ pxj)⇔ .g1 |= pxi ⊃ pxj ∧ g2 |= pxi ⊃ pxj ∧ · · · ∧ gn |= pxi ⊃ pxj
holds, we obtain ∗ 6|= ✷(pxi ⊃ pxj), when Dk = ǫxixj. Similarly, we get
∗ 6|= ✷(pxj ⊃ pxi), when Dk = ǫxjxi. Thus we have ∗ 6|= B(Dk) in both
cases.
(Case 2): The case of Dk = ǫxiyj for any i and j such that yj is not a tail
of the chain to which xi belongs. Then, by (M3).(ii) and (M3).(iii), there is
exactly one index 1 ≤ α ≤ n such that V (pxi , gα) = 1 and V (pyj , gα) = 0.
From this, we have ∗ 6|= ✷(pxi ⊃ pyj). So we get ∗ 6|= B(Dk).
(Case 3): The case of Dk = ǫxizj for any i and j. In this case we have
∗ |= pxi and ∗ |= pzj ⊃ .✷(pzj ⊃ pxi). But ∗ 6|= ✷(pxi ⊃ pzj ) holds as (Case
1).
(Case 4): The case of Dk = ǫyib for any i where b is arbitrary. From
(M3).(i) and Theorem 3.13, ∗ 6|= pyi holds. This makes our case verified.
(Case 5): The case of Dk = ǫzib for any i where b is arbitrary. Then, by
(M3).(i), ∗ 6|= pzi , thus ∗ 6|= B(Dk).
Next, we shall verify (††). In this case, there are only the following two
cases for Ek (1 ≤ k ≤ t).
(Case 6): The case of Ek = ǫxixj for any i and j such that xi and xj
belong to the same chain (because ψ is a Hintikka formula). By (M3).(i),
∗ |= pxi . By (M3).(ii), we have ∗ |= ✷(pxi ⊃ pxj) and ∗ |= pxj ⊃ ✷(pxj ⊃
pxi), since gα |= pxi ≡ pxj holds for any (1 ≤ α ≤ n). Thus, ∗ |= B(Ek).
(Case 7): The case of Ek = ǫxiyj for any i and j such that yj is a tail
of the chain to which xi belongs (because ψ is a Hintikka formula). By
(M3).(i), ∗ |= pxi . By (M3).(ii) and (M3).(iii), we obtain ∗ |= ✷(pxi ⊃ pyi).
By (M3).(i), we have ∗ |= pyj ⊃ ✷(pyj ⊃ pxi), since
∗ |= pyi and ∗ 6|= ✷(pyj ⊃ pxi)
holds as (Case 6). Hence, ∗ |= B(Ek).
We can now conclude ∗ 6|= B(ψ). This completes the whole proof for
(♣).
Corollary 4.2. (Blass [2]) B-translation is an embedding of L1 in K.
Proof. From Theorem 4.1.
13
5. The faithfulness for von Wright-type deontic logics
As von Wright-type deontic logic, we shall deal with ten Smiley-Hanson
systems of monadic deontic logic after A˚qvist [1], that is, OK, OM, OS4,
OB, OS5, OK+, OM+, OS4+, OB+, OS5+.
As primitive logical connectives, we take ⊤ (verum), ⊥ (falsum), ¬ (na-
gation), O (obligation), P (permission), ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction),→
(implication), ↔ (material equivalence). (We may think of O and P as ✷
and ✸, respectively.)
The well-formed formulas of each system are defined as usual as those of
propositional modal logics.
The two rules of inferences, modus ponens and O-necessitation (⊢ A
implies ⊢ OA) are common to all the ten Smiley-Hanson systems of monadic
deontic logic.
We need the following axiom schemata for the system.
(A0) All classical propositional tautologies
(A1) PA↔ ¬O¬A
(A2) O(A→ B)→ (OA→ OB)
(A3) OA→ PA
(A4) OA→ OOA
(A5) POA→ OA
(A6) O(OA→ A)
(A7) O(POA→ A)
First five systems are defined as follows.
OK = A0–A2
OM = A0–A2, A6
OS4 = A0–A2, A4, A6
OB = A0–A2, A6, A7
OS5 = A0–A2, A4, A5
Note that A6 and A7 are derivable in OS5.
Let X be any of these five systems. Then we define:
X+ = X, A3.
We shall recall the definition of accessibility relations as follows.
(AR1) R is serial in W ∀x∃(xRy)
(AR2) R is transitive in W ∀x∀y∀z(xRy ∧ yRz. ⊃ xRz)
(AR3) R is Euclidean in W ∀x∀y∀z(xRy ∧ xRz. ⊃ yRz)
(AR4) R is almost reflexive in W ∀x∀y∀z(xRy ⊃ yRy)
(AR5) R is almost symmetric in W ∀x∀y∀z(xRy ⊃ .yRz ⊃ zRy),
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where W is the set of possible worlds. With these relations we characterize
the systems as follows:
The class of OK-models has no condition R being imposed.
The class of OM-models has almost reflexive R.
The class of OS4-models has transitive and almost reflexive R.
The class of OB-models has almost symmetric and almost reflexive R.
The class of OS5-models has Euclidean and transitive R.
The class of OK+-models has serial R.
The class of OM+-models has serial and almost reflexive R.
The class of OS4+-models has serial, transitive and almost reflexive R.
The class of OB+-models has serial, almost symmetric and almost re-
flexive R.
The class of OS5+-models has serial, Euclidean and transitive R.
Theorem 5.1. (See [1]) The soundness and completeness theorems hold for
any ten Smiley-Hanson systems.
We shall take trivial adaptation BO of B-tranlation for the Smiley-
Hanson systems.
(O.i) BO(φ ∨ ψ) = BO(φ) ∨BO(ψ),
(O.ii) BO(¬φ) = ¬BO(φ),
(O.iii) BO(ǫab) = pa ∧O(pa ⊃ pb) ∧ .pb ⊃ O(pb ⊃ pa),
where pa and pb are propositional variables corresponding to the name vari-
ables a and b, respectively.
We may regard OK as K. The other systems are stronger than OK.
Hence the following theorem is easily proved model theoretically.
Theorem 5.2. For any of ten Smiley-Hanson systems, say SH, and any
formula φ of L1, we have
⊢TL1 φ⇒ ⊢SH B
O(φ).
With the slight modification of the accessibility relations as above, we can
obtain following theorem for the faithfullness of the adapted BO-translation.
Theorem 5.3. For any of ten Smiley-Hanson systems, say SH, and any
formula φ of L1, we have
⊢SH B
O(φ)⇒ ⊢L1 φ.
Proof. Let SH be one of ten Smiley-Hanson systems. Let φ be a formula
of L1. If the number of chain n ≥ 1 holds, we take, instead of the original
G and R
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(MO1) GO = {∗, g1, . . . , gn} ∪Gω,
where Gω = {ηj : j ∈ ω}, Card(Gω) = ℵ0, {∗, g1, . . . , gn} ∩ Gω = ∅ and
∗, g1, . . . , gn are distinct.
(MO2)
RO =


BR ∪ {(gi, gj) : i 6= j, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ n} if SH is
OS5 or OS5+
BR ∪ {(gi, gi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} otherwise.
where BR = {(∗, gi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {(η, η) : η ∈ Gω}.
If n = 0 holds we take
GO0 = {∗, g} ∪Gω as (M
O1),
RO0 =


{(∗, g)} ∪ {(η, η) : η ∈ Gω}. if SH is
OS5 or OS5+
{(∗, g), (g, ∗), (g, g)} ∪ {(η, η) : η ∈ Gω}. otherwise.
We shall take the same assignment as that for Theorem 4.1. The above
modification of the accessibility relations does not effect the truth of ∗ 6|=
BO(φ), since the additional parts of relations do not related to ∗. Hence we
prove this theorem with the same procedures of Theorem 4.1. We remark
that we can take the following relation
ROc = BR ∪ {(gi, gj) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ n}
in place of RO. Still ROc is Euclidean and it satisfies all other relations for
eight deontic logics.
From the above theorem,
Corollary 5.4. For any of ten Smiley-Hanson systems, say SH, and any
formula φ of L1, B-translation is an embedding of L1 in SH.
6. A general theorem on the faithfulness
First, as usual, a normal modal logic X is defined as follows:
(nor.1) K ⊆ X,
(nor.2) X is closed under modus ponens, substitution and the rule of
necessitation (i.e., ⊢ φ implies ⊢ ✷φ).
We may say that normal modal logics are extensions of K.
In this section, we shall give a general theorem on the faithfulness of
B-translation with respect to normal modal logics with transitive frames or
irreflexive ones.
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Theorem 6.1. Let X be a normal modal logic. Let I be an index set such
that ω ⊆ I. Suppose that X is complete with respect to a set of Kripke
frames, say F = {(Gα, Rα) : α ∈ I} where for any α ∈ I, Gα is a nonempty
infinite set and Rα is an accessibility relation on Gα. Let H be a set of
Kripke frames such that
(6.1.i) H = {(G∗i , R
∗
i ) : i ∈ ω},
(6.1.ii) For any i ∈ ω,
G∗i = {∗, g0, g1, . . . , gi} ∪Gωi,
where Gωi = {ηij : j ∈ ω}, Card(Gωi) = ℵ0, {∗, g1, . . . , gn} ∩ Gωi = ∅ and
∗, g1, . . . , gn are distinct and
R∗i = {(∗, gj) : 0 ≤ j ≤ i} ∪ {(η, η) : η ∈ Gω}.
If H ⊆ F holds, then B-translation is faithful with respect to X.
Proof. Suppose the assumption and the condition of the theorem to be
proved. Then we can take the same model-construction in the proof of (♣)
in §4 in order to prove the desired theorem.
Definition 6.2. By ExtKtirr, we denote the set of all normal logics such
that they are elements of ExtK and they are complete w.r.t. a set of tran-
sitive or irreflexive Kripke frames.
Corollary 6.3. Let X ∈ ExtKtirr. B-translation is faithful with respect
to X.
Proof. From Theorem 6.1.
Corollary 6.4. Let X ∈ ExtKtirr. B-translation is an embedding of L1
in X.
Proof. From Corollary 6.3.
As a direct consequece of the above corollary, we have the following.
Corollary 6.5. B-translation is an embedding of L1 in K4.
Proof. K4 is stronger thanK. And it is complete with respect to transitive
frames. Thus we obtain the soundness and faithfulness of B from Corollary
6.4.
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K4 is a subsystem of the provability logic PrL (= K4 + ✷(✷φ ⊃ φ) ⊃
✷φ). The subsystem is also called BML. PrL is also characterized by K +
✷(✷φ ⊃ φ) ⊃ ✷φ (see [6]).
We know that φ is a theorem of PrL iff φ is valid in all finite transitive
and irreflexive frames (see e.g. Boolos [3]; PrL is denoted by GL in [3], also
see Carnielli and Pizzi [5]). (Frames (W,R) in which W is finite and R is
irreflexive and transitive are called strict partial orders.) Thus we have:
Corollary 6.6. B-translation is an embedding of L1 in PrL.
Proof. In this case, we may take Gω = ∅ in the model construction of the
proof of Therem 4.1. So we can do all in finite models. From Theorem 6.1.
and Cororllary 6.4, our corollary holds, since our accessibility relations are
all finte transitive and irreflexive.
7. Further general results for the faithfulness
Considering the proof of Theorems 4.1, 5.3 and 6.1, we can obtain further
general theorems for the faithfulness of B-translation and their applications.
Theorem 7.1. Let X be a normal modal logic. Let I be an index set such
that ω ⊆ I. Suppose that X is complete with respect to a set of Kripke
frames, say F = {(Gα, Rα) : α ∈ I} where for any α ∈ I, Gα is a nonempty
infinite set and Rα is an accessibility relation on Gα. Let H be a set of
Kripke frames such that
(7.1.i) H = {(G∗i , R
∗
i ) : i ∈ ω},
(7.1.ii) For any i ∈ ω,
G∗i = {∗, g0, g1, . . . , gi} ∪Gωi,
where Gωi = {ηij : j ∈ ω}, Card(Gωi) = ℵ0, {∗, g1, . . . , gn} ∩ Gωi = ∅ and
∗, g1, . . . , gn are distinct and
R∗i = {(∗, gj) : 0 ≤ j ≤ i} ∪ {(gj , gk) : j 6= k, 1 ≤ j ≤ i, 1 ≤ k ≤ i}
∪{(η, η) : η ∈ Gωi}.
If H ⊆ F holds, then B-translation is faithful with respect to X.
Proof. From Theorem 4.1, 5.3 and 6.1.
Theorem 7.1 is applicable to normal modal logics with serial or irreflexive
or Euclidean or almost symmetric Kripke frames.
18
Theorem 7.2. Suppose that we take the same assumptions about X, I, F ,
H, G∗i , Gωi (for any i ∈ ω) in Theorem 7.1 with
R∗i = {(∗, gj) : 0 ≤ j ≤ i} ∪ {(gj , gj) : 1 ≤ j ≤ i}
∪{(η, η) : η ∈ Gωi}.
If H ⊆ F holds, then B-translation is faithful with respect to X.
Proof. From Theorems 4.1, 5.3 and 6.1.
Theorem 7.2 is applicable to normal modal logics with serial or transitive
or irreflexive or almost reflexive or almost symmetric Kripke frames.
Theorem 7.3. Suppose that we take the same assumptions about X, I, F ,
H, G∗i , Gωi (for any i ∈ ω) in Theorem 7.1 with
R∗i = {(∗, gj) : 0 ≤ j ≤ i} ∪ {(gj , gk) : 1 ≤ j ≤ i, 1 ≤ k ≤ i}
∪{(η, η) : η ∈ Gωi}.
If H ⊆ F holds, then B-translation is faithful with respect to X.
Proof. From Theorems 4.1, 5.3 and 6.1.
Theorem 7.3 is applicable to normal modal logics with serial or transitive
or irreflexive or Euclidean or almost reflexive or almost symmetric Kripke
frames.
Definition 7.4. By ExtKd, we denote the set of propositional modal logics
stronger thanK such that they are complete w.r.t. a set of serial or transitive
or irreflexive or Euclidean or almost reflexive or almost symmetric Kripke
frames.
Theorem 7.5. For any logic X ∈ ExtKd, B-translation is faithful with
respect to X.
Proof. From Theorem 7.3.
Corollary 7.6. For any logic X ∈ ExtKd, B-translation is an embedding
of L1 in X.
Proof. From Theorem 7.5.
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We recall the naming of modal logics as follows (refer to e.g. Poggiolesi
[31] and Ono [30], also see Bull and Segerberg [4]):
KD: K + ✷φ ⊃ ✸φ (D, serial relation)
KT: K + ✷φ ⊃ φ (T, reflexive relation)
K4: K + ✷φ ⊃ ✷✷φ (4, transitive relation)
KD4: K + D + 4 (serial and transitive relation)
KB: K + φ ⊃ ✷✸φ (B, symmetric relation)
KB4: K + B + 4 (symmetric and transitive relation)
KTB: KT + B (reflexive and symmetric relation)
S4: KT + 4 (reflexive and transitive relation)
S5: S4+B (reflexive, transitive and symmetric relation, i.e., equivalence
relation) or equivalently: KT + ✸φ ⊃ ✷✸φ (5, Euclidean relation),
where + means ⊕ in the sense of [6], which the system is closed under modus
ponens, substitution and the rule of necessitation. We use + in the sense
eveywhere in this paper. For those logics, we can give the corresponding
general theorems.
Theorem 7.7. Suppose that we take the same assumptions about X, I, F ,
H, G∗i , Gωi (for any i ∈ ω) in Theorem 7.1 with
R∗i = {(∗, gj) : 0 ≤ j ≤ i} ∪ {(gj , ∗) : 0 ≤ j ≤ i}∪
{(gj , gk) : j 6= k, 1 ≤ j ≤ i, 1 ≤ k ≤ i}
∪{(η, η) : η ∈ Gωi}.
If H ⊆ F holds, then B-translation is faithful with respect to X.
Proof. From Theorem 4.1, 5.3 and 6.1, we can take the same model con-
struction in the proof of Theorem 4.1 and prove it. We do not need take
care of {(gj , ∗) : 0 ≤ j ≤ i}, since we may only consider the worlds which ∗
can access.
Theorem 7.7 is applicable to normal modal logics with serial or irreflexive
or Euclidean or symmetric Kripke frames.
Theorem 7.8. Suppose that we take the same assumptions about X, I, F ,
H, G∗i , Gωi (for any i ∈ ω) in Theorem 7.1 with
R∗i = {(∗, gj) : 0 ≤ j ≤ i} ∪ {(gj , ∗) : 0 ≤ j ≤ i}∪
{(gj , gk) : 1 ≤ j ≤ i, 1 ≤ k ≤ i} ∪ {(∗, ∗)}
∪{(η, η) : η ∈ Gωi}.
If H ⊆ F holds, then B-translation is faithful with respect to X.
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Proof. From Theorem 4.1, 5.3 and 6.1, we can take the same model con-
struction in the proof of Theorem 4.1 and verify the theorem. What we need
to check is that of the cases (Case 1) and (Case 2) with the formulas as such
∗ |= ✷(pxi ⊃ pxj)⇔ .∗ |= pxi ⊃ pxj ∧ g1 |= pxi ⊃ pxj ∧ g2 |= pxi ⊃ pxj
∧ · · · ∧ gn |= pxi ⊃ pxj .
In (Case 1), ∗ |= pxi ⊃ pxj does not effect the proof of ∗ 6|= ✷(pxi ⊃ pxj)
in the proof of Theorem 4.1. In (Case 2), ∗ 6|= pxi ⊃ pyj leads to ∗ 6|=
✷(pxi ⊃ pyj). From this we have ∗ 6|= B(Dk). We remark that we shall take
G0 = {(∗, ∗)} ∪ {(η, η) : η ∈ Gω} and the same valuation, if the number of
chain is 0.
Theorem 7.8 is applicable to normal modal logics with serial or transitive
or reflexive or Euclidean or symmetric Kripke frames.
From Theorem 7.8, we can obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 7.9. Let X be one of logics KD, KT, K4, KD4, KB, KB4,
KTB, S4 and S5. B-translation is faithful with respect to X.
Proof. From Theorem 7.8.
Corollary 7.10. Let X be one of logics KD, KT, K4, KD4, KB, KB4,
KTB, S4 and S5. B-translation is an embedding of L1 in X.
Proof. From Theorem 7.9.
We shall remark that Theorem 7.8 is applicable to normal modal logics
with the following axioms and accessibility relations:
C4: ✷✷φ ⊃ ✷φ (∀x∀y(xRy ⊃ ∃z(xRz ∧ zRy)), dense relation)
C: ✸✷φ ⊃ ✷✸φ (∀x∀y∀z(xRy ∧ xRz. ⊃ ∃w(yRw ∧ zRw)), convergent
relation).
Theorem 7.11. Let X be a normal modal logic. If X has the finite model
property, then ’infinite’, G∗i = {∗, g0, g1, . . . , gi}∪Gωi and R
∗
i can be replaced
by ’finite’, G∗i = {∗, g0, g1, . . . , gi} and R
∗
i − {(η, η) : η ∈ Gωi} respectively,
in Theorems 6.1, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.7 and 7.8.
Proof. Let X be a normal modal logic. Suppose that X has the finite
model property. In the proof of Theorem 4.1, we can take Gω = ∅. Then
all proofs of Theorems 6.1, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.7 and 7.8 follow the modification
without any trouble.
For the finite model property, refer to e.g. Carnielli and Pizzi [5], Ono
[30] (especially for algebraic models) and so on.
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8. Comments
One motive from which I wrote [19] and [21] is that I wished to understand
Les´niewski’s epsilon ǫ on the basis of my recognition that Les´niewski’s epsilon
would be a variant of truth-functional equivalence ≡. Namely, my original
approach to the interpretation of ǫ was to express the deflection of ǫ from
≡ in terms of Kripke models. We may say that this is an approximation
of ǫ by something simple and symmetric, that is equivalence. In analysis,
the fundamental idea of calculus is the local approximation of functions by
linear functions. In mathematics, we can find a lot of such examples as
that of calculus. As an example in logic, a Gentzen-style formulation of
intuitionistic logic is nothing but an expression of the deflection from the
complete geometrical symmetry of Gentzen’s LK. Gentzenization of a logic
also has such a sense, as far as I am concerned.
It is well-known that Les´niewski’s epsilon can be interpreted by the
Russellian-type definite description in classical first-order predicate logic
with equality (see [24]). Takano [41] proposed a natural set-theoretic in-
terpretation for the epsilon. The other motive for the above papers of mine
is that I wanted to avoid such interpretations when we interpret Les´niewski’s
epsilon. I do not deny the interpretation using the Russellian-type definite
description and a set-theoretic one. I was rather anxious to obtain another
quite different interpretation of Les´niewski’s epsilon having a more proposi-
tional character.
We now know the quite satisfactory B-translation of which the discovery
is, in my opinion, monumental in the study of Les´niewski’s systems. B-
translation is very natural, if one tries to understand it in an intuitive way.
However I believe that there are still other interpretations which are in the
spirit of my original recognition mentioned above. One fullfilment of my
belief is the (2.W) in §1 (Inoue´ [22]).
For automated reasoning, I just mention that the Hintikka formulas of
L1 can be used as examples of which the validity in K is checked (see e.g.
Lagniez et al [28]).
I shall give an open problem being directly related to this paper.
Open problem 1. Is the condition of Theorems 6.1, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.7
and 7.8 (i.e., as {(6.1.i) and (6.1.ii))} and {(7.1.i) and (7.1.ii))}) the best
possible one for the faithfulness of B-translation ?
Other interesting open problems are:
Open problem 2. Give an algebraic proof of the faithfulness of B-
translation.
Open problem 3. Search for possibilities of embedding Les´niewski’s
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propositional ontology L1 in bi-intuitionistic logic and the display logic for
bi-intuitionistic logic (see Gore´ [13] and Wansing [45] for those logics).
Open problem 4. Search for possibilities of embedding Les´niewski’s
propositional ontology L1 in logics treated in Marx and Venema [29].
I think that this book is very important to consider. It is also worth
considering Gabbay, Kurucz, Wolter and Zakharyaschev [12] for temporal
and computational aspects, and products for modal logics, for example.
In relation to the theme of this paper, I shall give my conjectures.
Conjecture 1. L1 is embedded in some bimodal logic by some sound
translation.
I shall suggest a direction that, I believe, is to be proceeded for this
conjecture. Let T1, T2 be some normal modal propositional logics with
modal operators ✷1, ✷2, respectively. Let Tb be a bi-modal propositional
logic T1 + T2 + ✷2(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ ✷1(ψ ⊃ φ), for example.
∗ Then we define a
translation Bd(·) from L1 to Tb as follows:
(3.i) Bd(φ ∨ ψ) = Bd(φ) ∨Bd(ψ),
(3.ii) Bd(¬φ) = ¬Bd(φ),
(3.iii) Bd(ǫab) = pa ∧ ✷1(pa ⊃ pb) ∧ .pb ⊃ ✷2(pb ⊃ pa),
where pa and pb are propositional variables corresponding to the name vari-
ables a and b, respectively. By this translation, I believe that L1 is embedded
in Tb for some Tb.
Conjecture 2. Les´niewski’s propositional ontology L1 is embedded in
many other modal logics which are listed in, for example, Chagrov and
Zakharyaschev [6], Humberstone [15] and Gabbay and Guenthner [10].
Conjecture 3. Les´niewski’s propositional ontology L1 is embedded in
some temporal logics with several ways.
It seems to me that this conjecture 3 will give a broad possibility of
future research.
Conjecture 4. Les´niewski’s elementary ontology L is embedded in some
first-order modal predicate logic.
This conjecture 4 is the most important open problem in the next stage
of our direction of study. It is well-known that L with axiom ∃S(ǫSS) is
embedded in monadic second-order predicate logic (see Smirnov [36], [37]
and Takano [40]). I believe that by introuducing a modal operator, we could
reduce second-order to first-order for the embedding. In a similar direction,
a certain attempt has been carried out in Urbaniak [42] and [44]. If we find
such an embedding in a particular formal system with a modal operator
∗There would be many choices of relationizing ✷1 and ✷2, I believe.
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of a definite strength, it would be another breakthrough in the study of
Les´niewski’s systems.
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